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FEDERAL ESTATE TAX - MARITAL DEDUCTION -ANNUITY FOR LIFE Wrrn: 
GUARANTEED CERTAIN PAYMENTS NoT DIVIDED INTO Two PROPERTIES BY 
INSURER'S AccouNTING TREATMENT - Plaintiff, executor of decedent's estate, 
brought suit to recover an overpayment of federal estate tax. Decedent had 
purchased a life insurance policy1 and had elected an option under which 
proceeds would be paid to his wife in monthly payments for her life; how-
ever, the option also guaranteed a minimum of 240 payments. In the event 
the wife died before 240 payments were made, payments were to continue 
to decedent's daughter, or on the death of both wife and daughter, the 
commuted value of the remaining guaranteed payments would be paid in 
lump sum to the estate of the survivor. The insurers made book entries 
allocating $17,956.41 of the total proceeds to fund the 240 guaranteed 
payments- or "annuity certain" - and $7,231.09 to fund the annuity pay-
able to the wife to the extent that she might live longer than 240 months -
"contingent life annuity." No division of the proceeds was made by the 
terms of the policy. The federal estate tax was paid on the value of both 
the annuity certain and the contingent life annuity. Plaintiff then brought 
suit for a refund of the tax on the value of the contingent life annuity 
claiming that the separate accounting treatment of this annuity made it 
separate property, and that it therefore qualified for the marital deduction 
since the wife's interest in the contingent annuity was exclusive.2 The dis-
trict court accepted this theory, and allowed the refund,3 but was reversed 
by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.4 On certiorari to the United 
States Supreme Court, held, affirmed, three Justices dissenting.11 Because 
separate book entries by the insurer allocating portions of the total insur-
1 Another policy with identical provisions was also involved. 
2 The marital deduction and terminable interest provisions of the 1939 Code were 
applicable to the principal case. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 812 (e), ch. 361, 62 Stat. 117 
(1948) (now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2056). However, since § 2056 contains the same 
words as the 1948 amendment, it will hereinafter be referred to when discussing the prin-
cipal case instead of the equivalent section of the 1939 Code. 
The "terminable interest" provisions are prescribed by §§ 2056 (b) (I) (A) and 
2056 (b) (I) (B): 
" (b) Limitation in the case of Life Estate or other terminable interest. 
"(I) General Rule-Where on the lapse of time, on the occurrence of an event or 
contingency, or on the failure of an event or contingency to occur, an interest passing 
to the surviving spouse will terminate or fail, no deduction shall be allowed under this 
section with respect to such interest -
" (A) if an interest in such property passes or has passed (for less than an adequate 
and full consideration in money or money's worth) from the decedent to any person other 
than such surviving spouse (or the estate of such spouse); and 
"(B) if by reason of such passing such person (or his heirs or assigns) may possess or 
enjoy any part of such property after such termination or failure of the interest so 
passing to the surviving spouse •••• " 
8 Meyer v. United States, 166 F. Supp. 629 (W.D.N.Y. 1958). The district court 
followed the decision of Estate of Reilly v. Commissioner, 239 F.2d 797 (3d Cir. 1957), 43 
VA. L. REv. 587 (1957). 
4 Meyer v. United States, 275 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1959), 35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 849 (1960). 
IS Mr. Justice Douglas, with whom Mr. Justice Clark and Mr. Justice Brennan joined, 
dwented. 
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ance proceeds to fund the contingent and certain payments of an annuity 
are not sufficient to divide this annuity into separate properties, the pro-
ceeds constituted one "property" in which the widow had a terminable, 
and therefore a non-deductible, interest. Meyer v. United States, 364 U.S. 
410 (1960). 
In 1948 the Congress, in an attempt to equalize the tax burdens between 
common law and community property states,s passed the marital deduction 
provisions which allowed a deduction of as much as one half of the value of 
the decedent's adjusted gross estate for certain property passing from the 
decedent to his surviving spouse.7 However, property passing to the sur-
viving spouse which comes within the "terminable interest" provision ·will 
not qualify as marital deduction property.s Thus in the principal case the 
annuity certain was conceded to be unavailable for the marital deduction 
since the wife's interest in it would terminate if she died before 240 pay-
ments were made, and a third person, decedent's daughter, to whom an 
interest passed for less than adequate consideration might enjoy the rest 
of the guaranteed proceeds. If the Court were willing to regard the con-
tingent life annuity as separate property, however, that portion of the value 
of the contract would not come within the terminable interest provisions, 
for the annuity was owned exclusively by the wife. On facts similar to those 
in the principal case the Third Circuit in Estate of Reilly v. Commissioner9 
did accept the argument that separate book entries by the insurer made 
the contingent life annuity separate property which would then qualify as 
marital deduction property. The Supreme Court here refused to accept this 
"two properties" argument, although it did not decide whether two proper-
ties could ever exist in the total proceeds. The Court merely decided that 
here, since the total proceeds were not divided by the terms of the policy, 
only one "property" existed. 
The dissent suggests that the majority's analysis was erroneous because 
the terminable interest provisions refer to an "interest in property" instead 
of "property."10 The indicia of congressional intent indicate that Congress 
6 For discussion, see S. REP. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. I (1948); Polasky, Estate 
Tax Marital Deduction in Estate Planning, 3 Tax Counselor's Q., June 1959, p. I; Com-
ment, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 1176 (1959). 
7 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2056. 
8 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2056 (b) (1) quoted in note 2 supra. 
9 239 F.2d 797 (3d Cir. 1957). In that case the decedent had elected to have the 
proceeds of his insurance policy paid to his wife in the form of an annuity for her life 
with guaranteed payments for 10 years. These payments were to continue to the dece-
dent's children if his wife died within the IO-year period. The insurer allocated portions 
of the total proceeds by separate book entries; $28,149.63 was entered as the present 
value of the IO-year certain annuity, and $30,280.46 was entered as the present value of 
the annuity for the life of the wife which begins at a date 10 years in the future. The 
court held that this division of the proceeds on the books of the insurance company 
created "two properties," and it permitted the $30,280.46 to qualify for the marital 
deduction. 
10 Principal case at 418-19. 
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intended that these terms have different meanings.U The dissent agrees 
that the total insurance proceeds constitute one "property" and not two 
but asserts that the annuity certain and the contingent life annuity constitute 
two "interests" in this property because of the division made in the pro-
ceeds by separate book entries. The dissent concludes that the present 
value of the contingent life annuity qualifies for the marital deduction 
since the wife's interest in the contingent life annuity is not within the 
terminable interest provisions. 
Two questions are left open by the opinion in the principal case. First, 
is it possible to say that one person has more than one interest in a single 
property for purposes of the statute? For example, if the testator devises 
Blackacre "to my wife for 20 years but if she dies before the expiration of 
the period, to my son for the remainder of the 20 years, remainder to my ·wife 
or her estate," does the wife have one or tw'O interests in Blackacre? Neither 
the opinion in the principal case nor the regulations under section 205612 
decide whether "interest in property" means the total of the rights possessed 
by any one person or whether each right may be designated as a separate 
"interest in property." A second question raised by the dissent's argument 
concerns the proper construction of "such property" as used in section 
2056 (b) (1) (B). This section provides that property passing to the surviving 
spouse, although terminable, will not come within the terminable interest 
provisions if the spouse's ownership is exclusive or, as expressed by the Code, 
if a third person does not "possess or enjoy any part of such property after 
... [the] termination or failure of the interest ... passing to the surviving 
spouse .... "1 3 The dissent's conclusion is valid if "such property" refers 
to the "interest in property," in this case the contingent life annuity, since 
the inquiry would then be into whether the surviving spouse's o.vnership of 
the particular "interest" was exclusive. But the dissent's argument fails if 
"such property" refers to the total "property," in this case the total pro-
ceeds, for it is then immaterial how many "interests" the surviving spous€ 
has in the total property; the inquiry would be into whether a third person 
had any interest in any part of the total property.14 The dissent must 
answer both these questions before its position can be sustained, and neither 
the Reilly case nor the dissent in the principal case provides answers. 
11 See S. REP. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., Pt. 2, at 4 (1948). 
12 Treas. Reg. § 20.2056 (b)-1 (1958). 
13 INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 2056 (b) (1) (B). (Emphasis added.) 
14 If the position of the dissent on this point is accepted, it is clear that it cannot be 
applied to all divided property problems. For example, if the testator devises Blackacre 
to his wife for life, remainder to his son, "such property" must apply to the fee interest 
of Blackacre, for the wife's interest is deemed to be within the terminable interest provi-
sions. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056 (b)-1 (g) e:xample (I) (1958). The question then arises, in the 
case of other types of divided property, such as the insurance proceeds in the principal 
case, does "such property" have the same meaning? If it does not, which must be the 
position of the dissent, query, in which cases does "such property" mean the "interest in 
property" and in which cases does it refer to the "total property"? 
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There is one further difficulty in the position of the dissent. The argu-
ment that separate interests in property existed relies on the book entries 
made by the insurance company and not on the actions of the decedent. 
Regardless of what actuarial method lay behind the insurer's allocation of 
the total proceeds to finance the annuity payments to the wife and the 
daughter, the interest devised by the testator remains the same. But if the 
dissent's argument is accepted, the method used by the insurer to allocate 
the total proceeds to finance the annuities would change the amount of 
the marital deduction. For example, in the principal case the insurer made 
one book entry representing the present value of the 20-year annuity cer• 
tain and made another entry representing the present value of the annuity 
for the life of the wife from a date beginning in 20 years. It would have been 
possible, however, for the insurance company to handle the funding of the 
annuity by different book entries. The insurer could have first made a book 
entry of the present value of an ordinary 20-year annuity to the wife, 
wherein no payments would be made after the wife's death,15 and made 
another entry to provide the amount necessary to fund an annuity for 
the life of the wife beginning at a date 20 years hence. If these account• 
ing entries had been made by the insurance company, the wife's interest 
would be exclusive in the amount of the proceeds so set aside, and the 
daughter's interest would be limited to the remaining amount of the pro• 
ceeds.16 Thus although the decedent acted the same way in both cases, 
the amount of the marital deduction would vary with the book entries 
made by the insurance company. 
While the position of the dissent may be criticized, the majority opinion 
is concerned with the form and not the substance of the property interests 
created. The decedent could have purchased two insurance policies which 
would have achieved identical benefits for his wife and daughter, and the 
value of the policy providing for the contingent life annuity would in this 
event qualify for the marital deduction. Similarly, in Fidelity-Philadelphia 
Trust Co. v. Smith11 the Court appeared to favor form over substance. In 
that case the decedent aged seventy-six invested in three single premium life 
15 Since the wife might die within the 20-year period, this entry will be less than 
that for the present value of a 20-year annuity certain. 
16 To illustrate the difference in actuarial treatment and the resulting difference in 
the amount of the marital deduction, let (x) = 'the present value of an ordinary 20-year 
annuity to the wife, no more payments to be made on or after the wife's death; let (y) = 
the present value of the refund feature which on the death of the wife before 20 years 
would pay the rest of the 20-year certain annuity to the daughter; and let (z) = the 
present value of an annuity for the life of the wife beginning in 20 years for the rest of 
her life, payment contingent on the wife's being alive. Then (x + y + z) = the total 
value of the policy and (x + y) = the present value of a 20-year certain annuity. The 
method used by the insurer in the principal case necessitated making two book entries: 
(x + y) and (z). If the dissent's approach were adopted, (z) would equal the amount of 
the marital deduction. The alternative method would necessitate three book entries: (x), 
(y), and (z). Since the daughter has an interest only in (y), (x + z) would equal the amount 
of the marital deduction if this alternative method of accounting entries were used. 
17 356 U.S. 274 {1958), 56 MICH. L. REv. 1366 (1958). 
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insurance policies the issuance of each of which was conditioned upon the 
purchase of a single premium annuity of specified value; no physical exam-
ination was required. The effect of this transaction was substantially identi-
cal to the creation of a trust with a reserved life estate. Nevertheless, the 
Court held that although each combination was the product of a single, 
integrated transaction, the contracts were from the time of issuance separate 
and distinct and therefore that decedent could not be said to have retained 
a life interest in the transferred property. Thus in both of these cases the 
Supreme Court has sacrificed substance for form as it struggled to apply 
the Code to property interests divided in time. 
William S. Bach 
